Timeline SkS Forum Hack

I’ve been trying to trace through the “spaghetti reconstruction of ‘the hack'” that Bob is writing at SkS (titles “A Hack By Any Other Name” I-VI ). The table below has my timetable as best I can figure it out. I have not interlaced any of our discoveries of hackers enjoying themselves at John Cooks old sites (where someone might have practiced.) The badly formatted table below is my first attempt to put things in order; there could be mistakes. I consider this a ‘work in progress’ and will edit.

Notice most of the interesting stuff is on Feb 21– and published in part VI. Earlier parts are more discussions of the panic and confusion a month later in March when the contents of the forum were disseminated.

At this point, hack seems much more plausible than leak. Possibly, if we had all know just how pathetic security at SkS was, everyone would have thought ‘hack’ more plausible. But who would have dreamed that anyone could develop and implement a site that with security this poor.

For now, here goes.

— Opening the Forum

Incomplete Timetable of SkS Hack
March2010 The “Wayback Machine” crawler visits uris with filenames matching pattern used by SkS for their SQLI ‘log’ file. (That is: it somehow “knows” to try to visit uris with the ‘pattern’ http://skepticalscience.com/lots/year_mon_day.txt.
WaybackVisitsLogsFile
Feb 21,20126:52 AM AEDT
(Feb 20, 8:52 PM CET)
PartI Bob Lacatana tells us “The German” “first hacked his way into the Skeptical Science web site” SkS using Tor Browser, or at least Tor. (IP not provided. Method of entry not stated).
Feb 21,06:52:41 VI Details about what happened at 6:52 am are provided in Part VI

Someone visits the http://www.skepticalcience.com
146.185.23.179 www.skepticalscience.com - [21/Feb/2012:06:52:41 +1100] "GET / HTTP/1.1" 200 20318 "-" "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; rv:5.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/5.0" "-" 322 20756 urchindyn www.skepticalscience.com
There is no session ID. Also: this doesn’t look like any sort of hack. It looks like an ordinary visit to “skepticalsceince.com” although IP 146.185.23.179 is currently associated with “torland1-this.is.a.tor.exit.server.torland.me’.

Someone with the same user agent but different IP loads (i.e. GET) www.skepticalcience.com/register.php. That’s SkS’s normal registration page (and still exists. It’s the page with the ridiculously bot-solvable captcha based on uri www.skepticalscience.com/securityimage/securityimage.php?code=LUCIA ). This visitor now has a session ID.
74.120.15.150 www.skepticalscience.com - [21/Feb/2012:07:21:34 +1100] "GET /register.php HTTP/1.1" 200 5703 "http://www.skepticalscience.com/" "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; rv:5.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/5.0" "PHPSESSID=bfa907024e1f028377f57159b9e9ed13" 622 6076 urchindyn www.skepticalscience.com

They visit register again…. This time posting (i.e. POST). Note: I would never let someone using TOR “POST”.
74.120.15.150 www.skepticalscience.com - [21/Feb/2012:07:24:01 +1100] "POST /register.php HTTP/1.1" 200 5445 "http://www.skepticalscience.com/register.php" "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; rv:5.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/5.0" "PHPSESSID=bfa907024e1f028377f57159b9e9ed13" 855 5818 urchindyn www.skepticalscience.com

The visitors is shown the ‘confirm’ page and apparently assigned the id 6304. Note: this is a ‘GET’.
74.120.15.150 www.skepticalscience.com - [21/Feb/2012:07:24:56 +1100] "GET /confirm.php?u=6304 HTTP/1.1" 200 5407 "-" "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; rv:5.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/5.0" "PHPSESSID=bfa907024e1f028377f57159b9e9ed13" 585 5780 urchindyn www.skepticalscience.com

Possibly, ‘dieter’ returns after getting a confirm code by email? This is a POST.
74.120.15.150 www.skepticalscience.com - [21/Feb/2012:07:25:34 +1100] "POST /confirm.php?u=6304 HTTP/1.1" 200 5258 "http://www.skepticalscience.com/confirm.php?u=6304" "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; rv:5.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/5.0" "PHPSESSID=bfa907024e1f028377f57159b9e9ed13" 793 5695 urchindyn www.skepticalscience.co

Note: even now this does not appear to be any sort of “hack”. It’s just someone registering using SkepticalScience.com’s ordinary registration tool, and then ‘confirming’. SkepticalScience requires people to do this before they can comment.

Now: Lacatana tells us

He visited his profile, where he immediately tried to edit his own User ID cookie, changing it from 6304 to John’s 1, but without success. He tried several variations before deleting all of his cookies except for the User ID cookie, still set to 1. That worked. With the next page display, he saw a menu of options beneath the login window which reflected John’s expanded capabilities.

This is starting to look like “a hack”. The visitor is doing stuff one would pretty much know they aren’t “supposed” to do, and in particular is trying to escalate privileges. Note however: the fact the user does this immediately suggest the visitor already knew or strongly suspected that the “cookie” method would let him in. (Given the extensive discussions by hackers practicing their skillz on John Cooks old cartoon site, it may be that he guessed based on that.)

 
07:49:01
VI Less than half an hour after ‘first’ breaking in, User 6304 visits, he successfully changes into user 1 (John Cook). This was done by editing his cookie to tell the server he was John Cook. The handy “cookie” method of identification was conceived of and programmed by John Cook. Anyway, these seem to be the logs showing he succeeded:

80.237.226.74 www.skepticalscience.com - [21/Feb/2012:07:49:01 +1100] "GET /profile.php?a=updateprofileform HTTP/1.1" 200 21118 "-" "-" "PHPSESSID=bfa907024e1f028377f57159b9e9ed13; UserId=6304" 173 21446 urchindyn www.skepticalscience.com
(Note: the user is using a blank user agent i.e. ‘-‘, and no referrer ‘-‘. I would ban this visit automatically especially to anything visiting an administrative function like ‘/profile.php?updateprofileform’. )

80.237.226.74 www.skepticalscience.com - [21/Feb/2012:07:49:55 +1100] "GET /profile.php?a=updateprofileform HTTP/1.1" 200 21118 "-" "-" "PHPSESSID=bfa907024e1f028377f57159b9e9ed13; UserId=1" 175 21446 urchindyn www.skepticalscience.com

93.182.132.103 www.skepticalscience.com - [21/Feb/2012:07:55:48 +1100] "GET /profile.php?a=updateprofileform HTTP/1.1" 200 5438 "-" "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; rv:5.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/5.0" "PHPSESSID=bfa907024e1f028377f57159b9e9ed13; UserId=6304" 612 5811 urchindyn www.skepticalscience.com
Note: The user is now using a blank referrer; the user agent is “Mozilla/5.0….”

93.182.132.103 www.skepticalscience.com - [21/Feb/2012:07:58:36 +1100] "GET / HTTP/1.1" 200 69774 "-" "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; rv:5.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/5.0" "UserId=1" 172 70206 urchindyn www.skepticalscience.com

Lacatana writes

“What was odd, however, was that between the change from user ID 6304 to user ID 1, the hacker’s session cookie vanished. It was clear, from this, that he had manually edited his cookies, deleting his session ID and changing his user ID to 1. Looking back through the logs, he’d tried the same thing a few minutes earlier, without any luck, because he hadn’t deleted his session cookie.

In other words: It took ‘dieter’ all of 10 minutes to try the cookie method, notice the ‘problem’ and figure out how to use the vulnerability John Cook has programmed into the system for logging into the “super-secret” forum and escallating his privileges to “super user” or “admin”.

The reason this could be done quickly is that the security at Skeptical Science was utter crap. Not only did it share vulnerabilities common to many forums (e.g. “timthumb” type vulnerabilities for image uploads) but it has specially purpose vulnerabilities coded by John Cook. Beyond that, they have no traps to slow anything down. (No whitelisting for IPs in admin– which could have excluded this guy from ‘admin’ even if he’d changed his cookie. No blocking Tor from admin. No blocking administrative or author-only features from entities that leave blank referrers. It was just wide open.)

Feb 21:09:15:35 PartVI Already in admin and having managed to locate the image upload form:
173.254.216.67 www.skepticalscience.com - [21/Feb/2012:09:15:35
+1100] "GET /admin_moderate.php?Action=UploadImageForm HTTP/1.1" 200 5811 "http://www.skepticalscience.com/admin_moderate.php"

Feb 1209:33:52 Looks around a bit, possibly learn something that gives him confidence the image upload form shares the well know “timthumb.php” vulnerability and uses it to upload ‘temp.php’.
74.120.15.150 www.skepticalscience.com - [21/Feb/2012:09:33:52 +1100] "POST /admin_moderate.php?Action=UploadImageResults HTTP/1.1" 200 5493 "http://www.skepticalscience.com/admin_moderate.php?Action=UploadImageForm" "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; rv:5.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/5.0" "PHPSESSID=dc2cbe0b2abcf0f069b234019197c8ca; UserId=6304" 1079 5866 urchindyn www.skepticalscience.com

Tests to see if temp.php (which it is):
74.120.15.150 www.skepticalscience.com - [21/Feb/2012:09:33:57 +1100] "GET /images/temp.php HTTP/1.1" 200 10758 "http://www.skepticalscience.com/admin_moderate.php?Action=UploadImageResults" "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; rv:5.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/5.0" "PHPSESSID=dc2cbe0b2abcf0f069b234019197c8ca; UserId=6304" 683 10980 urchindyn www.skepticalscience.com

He later uploads “temp2.php” and “temp3.php” giving him lots of toys to play with.

Feb 21:10:07:41 Visit to /logs file
199.48.147.37 www.skepticalscience.com - [21/Feb/2012:10:07:41 +1100] "GET /logs/2012-02-21.txt HTTP/1.1" 200 3661007 "-" "Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; rv:5.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/5.0" "PHPSESSID= [...]
Looks like no referrer.
Note after writing this, Bob says “they were all Tor relay nodes”. Really? Relay nodes? Not exit nodes?
Feb 21,12:07:09 Based on referrer seems to be looking at logs: 173.254.216.66 www.skepticalscience.com - [21/Feb/2012:12:07:29 +1100] "POST /images/temp3.php HTTP/1.1" 200 5534 "http://www.skepticalscience.com/images/temp3.php?frame=3&dir_atual=/home/7-web/74/95/skepticalscience.com/public/www/logs/" Lacatana diagnoses this as “he truncated first the day’s SQL injection log file”.
Feb 21

At 12:17 PM, he found an old database backup file, from July of 2011,

It’s Feb 21, 2012. I guess they keep database backups forever.

Anyway, he pokes around more, manages to find a file containing the credentials for accessing the database, adds those to a program he uploaded and then snags the database. Then he cleans up some traces.

That pretty much looks like how he did it– though later he visits again and repeats.

Feb 222012 Wayback visits SkS private forum and reads a thread. These addresses seem to end with “thread.php”.

WaybackCatchesSkSdiscussingBlackboard

Feb 22,2012 The Wayback Machine visits the secret SkS forum.
Feb22_2012_SkSForumWayback
Feb 23,2012 — 2:08 AM AEDT
(Feb 22,4:08 PMGermany.)
PartII Lacatana writes

It was February 22nd, 4:08 PM in Germany when the hacker returned, two days after his initial hack. Tor rotated his IP address 22 times during the three hour incursion.

According to Lacatana, during this visit, “The German” poked around doing a lot of things on the admin side of the forum. He created a user named “francois”, uploading a file called ‘f2’, read some forum entries, made himself a full directory listing– including one of the /logs subdirectory– made the forum publicly accessible changed moderation controls on the directory listing, uploaded a file called ‘un’ which when run deleted ‘f2’ and itself .

We are not told how “The German” hacked in on this day. (Possibly by reading a file in the /logs subdirectory, finding the admin name and password and entering those.)

Note: These activities if they occurred would sound like what people who are not specialists call “hacking” but some specialists might call “cracking”. In any case, if done by someone who is not authorized to fiddle around on the ‘admin’ side of the forum, they sound like someone doing things he would perfectly well know he ought not to be doing.

23 Feb 2012,12:33 PM PartII John Cook tells the SkS private forum

I’ve programmed the website to email me whenever someone tries to use SQL injection to hack SkS. Just got 334 400 emails now – each an attempt to hack SkS using SQL injection over a 4 minute period.

The IP is 221.143.48.210 which is based in South Korea.

Okay, the forum glitch and now this, I’m getting a little freaked out.

Feb 25,12:33 PMAEST PartIII ‘The German’ evidently returns using Tor. Bob Lacatana writes “The slowness of the Tor connection meant that it was several minutes before he could start work.”. (I’ve used Tor. It’s slow but it ain’t that slow.) He evidently visited the /logs directory and began downloading.

He tried to get the log for the 25th, which didn’t exist yet (in zipped form), as well as the logs for the 20th through the 22nd, which had already been moved to an off-site backup area that he didn’t know about and couldn’t reach. Downloading the files (6 megabytes each) through Tor, with its slow performance, took close to twenty minutes.

Note: Assuming these are .zipped, these files are huge.

Next

After that he went straight to the forum, using his original, hacked administrative ID

He read stuff of interest to him, then looked up Dana’s entry in the user table and left.

Feb 25 PartIII look at the database user entry for John Mashey
Feb 27 PartIII he downloaded a SQL injection log file, the smaller, zipped version for February 26th
Mar 5 in Germany,1:26 AM CET PartIII “First, he grabbed the zipped log file form March 3rd. It took a full forty minutes to download all 6.8 megabytes via Tor”
“uploaded another program that he had written, one named “u1”, tried to run, it, had to fiddled a bunch, uploaded again, finally got it to work.

U sing u1 he downloaded the zipped database afterwhich he uploaded “u2” which he used to delete u1 and u2 itself.

Mar 10,2012 Wayback appears to visit SkS forum thread (thread.php?t=2201&p=18351 ) and is presented login page. (Note: I’m not sure this was the private forum. But my impression is ‘thread.php’ indicates an attempt to visit the private forum. Here, it would appear the software presented the login page in response to the request.)
WaybackVisitsForumLoginPage.
10:41 PM,Mar 22,2012 PartI “Anonymous” leaves a note at Tom Nelson’s blog. Among other things that file mentions a database logs and some files, including specifically mentioning two ‘.zip’ files

…An anonymous whistleblower has brought to my attention some database logs and other files (e.g., http://www.skepticalscience.com/logs/2012-03-21.zip (the current day is txt, past days zip)). These files detail everything that happens on the site, from forum conversations to user accounts. I have collated some of the data in a more readable form.

http://files.molongo.ru/en/my/sks.zip

Why has SkS chosen to publish all this on the public internet? Is it the first step towards transparency, or a catastrophic error? This is what I first intended to ask Mr. Cook.

March 24,20121:06 AMAEDT PartI Lacatana visits SkS forum and reads note indicating that Grypo says SkS has been hacked.
Mar 23,201210:52 AM,EST Bob Lacatana reads contents of “.zip” file. He doesn’t say which ‘.zip’ but based on narrative, it appears Bob means the “.zip” file from the “.ru” site. Bob reports that the contents of that ‘.zip’ file appeared similar but not identical to SkS’s private forum. Differences included use of users full names, their emails and IP addresses.
Mar 24,2012 PartII
& III
SkS forum members speculate about ‘hack/leak’ in private forum. It’s clear “Anonymous” or whoever gave the files to Anonymous who posted at Tom Nelson’s had access to lots of stuff.

John Cook reveals existence of what appears to be the ‘/logs’ directory to SkS members. (This appears to match the directory visited by the Wayback in 2010.)

John moved on to look at another file, one with which I wasn’t at all familiar and hadn’t yet grabbed from the hack. It was entirely separate from the zip file I’d downloaded. John explained as he reviewed it that it was a log file, generated daily, of every database SQL statement used by the web site in the past day.

In part III, Lacatana tells us:

But now that bit of prevention — at least at first glance — looked like it might have become the source of our current troubles. Because the file contained every SQL statement from a given day, it also inadvertently contained the values which users had been entering as passwords. When the logs were set up to automatically record every database query issued by the system, it never occurred to John and Doug that some of those values might be unencrypted passwords, and that the files might also not be secured from visibility because of where they were being written, and finally that someone some day might find a way to locate one of the files. If someone somehow got at the file, then the file itself would give you the username and password of every person who’d logged on during the period covered by that particular log file.

Of course we can see from a 2010 screenshot from the Wayback that someone could easily be aware of this /logs directory and files inside it as well as the naming convention for the files themselves.

If there were any doubt, however, there would have been a long record of failed access attempts, looking for wrong names, in the system’s access log files — there would have been a string of 403 and 404 errors. There were none. That was not how he did it. There must have been another way in.

Of course there would only be a string of 403 and 404 responses in their error logs if something or someone had guessed numerous incorrect or forbidden uri’s. If the visitor guessed correctly– as they might by examining the pattern of uri’s recorded at ‘The Wayback’ there would not have been a long string of “404” or “403” errors. Rather, SkS investigators would have seen “200” in their access logs everytime something visited and downloaded the file.

Equally importantly, if SkS investigators have saved all their error logs back to 2010, it seem to me they should have seen the ‘404’ recorded when the Wayback visited a deleted .txt file back in 2010. Bob reports no such error. He also doesn’t report the successful (‘200’) access to a forum thread by the Wayback in February and doesn’t mention what might be a successful (‘200’) access to the login page on March 10, 2012.

The way this reads, it appears this file would contain every command used to modify the database on the date associated with its time stamp. So the one for ‘2012-03-21’ would presumably contain all queries submitted on 3/21/2012. Presumably the log for 2010-03-11.txt visited by the wayback in 2010 would have contained all the queries submitted for that day. This suggests that a vigilant snooper might have obtained all queries required to reconstruct forum discussions from at least March 2010 until the /logs file was closed.

Mar 24,2012 PartII Bob Lacatana’s belief at that time, and when writing Part II was

There were still no links to the forum, so if you didn’t log in with an contributor level ID, you wouldn’t know the forum existed. But if you did know where to go, you now wouldn’t need a valid user ID to see the contents.

This belief was mistaken as “The Wayback” machine had crawled to the forum on February 18, 2012. The Wayback itself must have learned the existence of the forum and anyone visiting The Wayback to search the history of SkS files could have learned the existence of the forum. Beyond that: often people learn of the existence of uri’s from referrers. So unless SkS was very clever, many might have learned of the existence of the forum from their referrers.

Mar 24,2012 PartII Bob Lacatana’s belief at that time, and when writing Part II was

The forum was open for about four hours before John reset the user levels on all of the “exposed” topics. Only two unknown IP addresses (not protected by Tor) visited the forum in that short span, one from Houston, Texas, but almost an hour after the forum had been re-secured, and one from Phoenix, Arizona, once while the forum was open, but without visiting any actual threads and so without seeing anything private, and the other several hours after the forum had been re-secured.

Mar 24,2012 Bob doesn’t mention whether the Texas IP corresponds to the Wayback Machine which took a screen shot of thread.php?t=2094&r=8 and no longer presented login page. This would seem consistent with visiting after the forum was closed.
AfterClosed
PartIII Discussing the ‘hack/leak’ Bob Lacatana continued

This is a plausible sounding distraction, for the eargerly gullible. The data provided could never have come just from the log files. They don’t go back far enough, since the hack contained data back to the site’s inception in 2007. They are also stored off-site and deleted every few days from the web site itself. One simply could not reconstruct the entire database from a handful of logs, or even several month’s worth, or even every log ever generated. If the hack had released a day or a week or even a couple of months worth of data, then this claim might have been credible. But it did not. The hack released data, complete data, going back years.

In fact: the more than a ‘handful” of logs had been made available. Logs had been made available since at least 2010, spanning the entire history of existence of the SkS forums. And as Brandon pointed out: the fact that the /logs began in 2010 doesn’t mean that data from 2007 couldn’t have been uploaded. It’s entirely possible that at some time between 2010 the admin had uploaded a back up for the “user” table in the database doing so by submitting queries. Had someone done this, the entire user table would have been made available through the ‘logs’ file. We don’t know if an admin did do that, but not only not impossible, it’s not even improbable.

Mar 25,2012 The Wayback visits the SkepticalScienceLogs directory looking specifically for the March 21, 2012 log.
WaybackVisitsSkSLogs.

I’ll be adding more to this timeline when VII (or more) are posted.

Worth exploring:
https://web.archive.org/web/*/http://www.skepticalscience.com/forum.php*
Shows Wayback was “aware” of forum page. Snapshots of forum.php are of login page.
and
https://web.archive.org/web/*/http://www.skepticalscience.com/topic.php*
Shows web.archive visited “topics” page.
Snapshots from 2010 are of login page.
and:
https://web.archive.org/web/*/http://www.skepticalscience.com/thread.php*

18 thoughts on “Timeline SkS Forum Hack”

  1. I think it’s hilarious Bob Lacatena says nobody could have known about the forum without having the right permissions. When I found the images directory that had their Photoshop projects in it, it was at the new location for their forum. I found that page without even trying. I was given the URL for it in a Skeptical Science post.

    The reality is knowing about that forum wasn’t difficult. Anyone who was interested enough in Skeptical Science could have found out about it.

    Skeptical Science may like to portray this hack as them being targeted by a skilled hacker or whatnot, but the reality is this could have been done by any script kiddie. I’d wager the only reason Skeptical Science didn’t get hacked more often is its security is so stupid nobody could anticipate it.

    It’s like a bank that shuts its vault but doesn’t lock it.

  2. Your right hand box,with the comments, are cutting off words. I’m using an iPad Air.

  3. Brandon

    It’s like a bank that shuts its vault but doesn’t lock it.

    More like a bank that doesn’t lock the vault, and then the owner decides the door is too heavy to pull, so he puts in a ‘secret’ back door that lets people enter from the loading dock and then post directions about various entrances in a broom closet that “only he and the janitor use” and then tells people in the front office to admit anyone who presents them with a paper that says “I am John Cook” into the room with access to the vault and….

    The pileup of ‘back doors’, ‘secret entry methods’, ‘fake captchas’, ‘fake credentials’ permitted by that site was amazing

    The fact that Bob can write stuff as stupid as this

    Unfortunately, John’s implementation was far too simplistic. Of course, he had also implemented it all the way back in 2007, when the site first began and all that a visitor could do was to post a comment. It’s no wonder that such functionality, among other things, was not revisited and tightened up as the site literally began to explode with new functionality

    It’s “no wonder”? John wrote a ‘registration’ method whose only function appeared to be to:
    1) demand or request peoples ‘private information’ (i.e. email, name) to have the right to comment and
    2) possibly slow down garden variety spambots.

    Note– I say ‘garden variety’ because as far as we can tell, someone could still write a script that read the uri of the captcha, notice the ‘code’ and mass enrolled members using throw-away email addresses. And then they could spam the heck out of that site.

    But apart from the spambots: later when creating a “secure” or “private” site, John Cook didn’t even think about security. This has nothing to do with the site “exploding with new functionality”. Lots of stuff at the site does not need much security. The trend calculator? The various pages to answer ‘skeptic arguments” and so on? But he added this one thing that needed “security”, and did nothing to secure it.

    He didn’t even think about it.

    And the SkS group persists in thinking that “private” site which leaves referrers in other peoples logs, somehow was “unknown” to other people and that somehow this “obscurity” would provide “security”. What. Bunk. Of course people knew the forum existed!

    The big question is: Why did the guy wait a month to ‘leak’?

  4. I wouldn’t be too critical of Skeptical Science for having bad security if that’s all there was to it. Lots of sites have bad security. Lots of people don’t understand it. It’s bad, but it’s not that remarkable.

    My problem with Skeptical Science is it pretends to have good security, and it makes excuses for whatever mistakes it admits. You never see them just say, “Yeah, that was a boneheaded mistake.” Instead, when I found a publicly accessible directory with some embarrassing images in it, Rob Honeycutt said I hacked them.

    That’s what bugs me about this. Any knowledgeable IT person should laugh at the things they say. They’re pretending to have far more knowledge and skill than they actually have. Given I know they do that in a field I know a lot about, I have to assume they do it in fields I don’t know a lot about.

    On a related note, Skeptical Science is a fairly popular site. If they wanted help with security, they could just ask. They’d get a number of people willing to do it for free. The fact they don’t is disturbing.

  5. Lucia,

    More like a bank that doesn’t lock the vault, and then the owner decides the door is too heavy to pull, so he puts in a ‘secret’ back door that lets people enter from the loading dock and then post directions about various entrances in a broom closet that “only he and the janitor use” and then tells people in the front office to admit anyone who presents them with a paper that says “I am John Cook” into the room with access to the vault and….

    I’m going to be chuckling about this the rest of the day, thanks!

  6. Brandon,
    I agree lots of people have bad security. I can’t even say I’m unhackable: I assume that I could be hacked if someone tried.

    Part of the problem is that John Cook seems to want to implement all “invented here” methods and didn’t reveal them to the volunteers who jumped in to delve into the hack until after the fact. And as you observe, they don’t comment that something was a boneheaded mistake. The fact is: It was a boneheaded mistake to use a “Cookie” method that massed nothing more than the user ID. Had the cookie method even passed a hashed password and user name, that might have been better since in that case, the hacker would have to guess a password. But just the ID?! It’s a wonder they weren’t hacked sooner. (And for all we know, they were.)

  7. Brandon Shollenberger (Comment #126767)
    March 14th, 2014 at 11:16 am

    [. . .]
    That’s what bugs me about this. Any knowledgeable IT person should laugh at the things they say. They’re pretending to have far more knowledge and skill than they actually have. Given I know they do that in a field I know a lot about, I have to assume they do it in fields I don’t know a lot about.
    [. . .]

    Brandon Shollenberger.

    Once it is observed that they will pretend in some areas then my overall focus on them would change in every area.

    It would make me most interested in and be more critically focused on why they are saying the things they say on any subject instead of what they say on any subject.

    My focus shifts to ulterior purposes they could have to pretend across the board.

    Harsh? No, I think not, given the potential impact of the science discussed.

    John

  8. The sksforum.org sends a page whose html reads

    This is sort of funny.

    If you create an address like this:
    http://www.sksforum.org/thread.php?t=10640&p=105410
    with a really big number after p=

    The sksforum.org sends a page whose html reads

    <html>
    <head>
    <script type=”text/javascript”>
    <!–
    window.location = “”
    //–>
    </script>
    </head>
    <body>
    <a href=””> </a>
    </body>
    </html>

    You get a sort of “blinking blank pages” phenomena until you stop the window.
    (If you are wondering how I found this, I added a ‘0’ after http://www.sksforum.org/thread.php?t=10640&p=10541 which forwards to DavidAppels blog.)

    You get a sort of “blinking blank pages” phenomena until you stop the window.
    (If you are wondering how I found this, I added a ‘0’ after http://www.sksforum.org/thread.php?t=10640&p=10541 which forwards to DavidAppels blog.)

  9. ” The handy “cookie” method of identification was conceived of and programmed by John Cook”

    That made my day.

  10. On the thread about my comments, Neil J. King (a Skeptical Science team member) made a laughable mistake.

    He dug out his old physics book and used a few equations about energy distribution among molecules, but they were equations that did not take into account the force of gravity. That was the very thing we were talking about, namely how gravity brings about an autonomous thermal gradient (aka lapse rate) in any planet’s troposphere.

    So Neil King wrote about how he “can calculate the number of visitors in both directions (and in particular, a molecule that starts out with “normal” speed at 0 and ends up with “cool” speed at z; and the reverse), and they are equal.”

    Well, Neil King, you seem to have forgotten that “0” is a lower level than “z” and that good old gravity slows things down a bit when they go up. It never accelerates them upwards – just downwards Neil King.

  11. Awesome! It was fun to gain access to the SKS site thanks to a very smart hacker. I won’t tell you who he is. He can claim the credit or continue to lurk in the undergrowth.

    I advised SKS that their security had failed by sending them this link:
    http://www.gallopingcamel.info/docs/DeletedCamel.doc

    SKS fixed the problem by archiving the relevant files but they are still vulnerable.

    SKS is a pathetic joke. Don’t waste any more time with losers like Jon Cook and Dana Nukeatelly.

  12. I guess article lift-out quotes are normally the job of an independent editor (non-author).

    Assuming in this case though that Bob is his own editor, we have Bob deciding to lift-out himself writing “I was ready to send the FBI after him…”. That seems incredibly pompous to me – ego milking his moment in the sun.

    If Batman was a climate crusader…

    “The hacker put a lot of time into this — time that might have been better used studying and understanding the science of climate change.”

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